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Abstract 
As a significant emitter of greenhouse gases, but also as a developing country starting from a low 
emissions base, India is an important actor in global climate change mitigation. However, 
perceptions of India vary widely, from an energy-hungry climate deal-breaker to a forerunner of a 
low carbon future. Developing clarity on India’s energy and emissions future is challenged by the 
uncertainties of India’s development transitions, including its pathway through a demographic and 
urban transition within a rapidly changing policy context.  Model-based scenario analyses provide 
widely varying projections, in part because they make differing assumptions, often implicit, about 
these transitions. To address the uncertainty in India’s energy and emissions future, this Letter 
applies a novel interpretive approach to existing scenario studies. First, we make explicit the implied 
development, technology and policy assumptions underlying model-based analysis in order to 
cluster and interpret results. In a second step, we analyse India’s current policy landscape and use 
that as a benchmark against which to judge scenario assumptions and results.  Using this 
interpretive approach, we conclude that, based on current policies, a doubling of India’s CO2 energy-
related emissions from 2012 levels is a likely upper bound for its 2030 emissions and that this 
trajectory is consistent with meeting India’s Paris emissions intensity pledge. Because of its low 
emissions starting point, even after a doubling, India’s 2030 per capita emissions will be below 
today’s global average and absolute emissions will be less than half of China’s 2015 emissions from 
the same sources. The analysis of recent policy trends further suggests a lower than expected 
electricity demand and a faster than expected transition from coal to renewable electricity. The 
Letter concludes by making an argument for interpretive approaches as a necessary complement to 
scenario analysis, particularly in rapidly changing development contexts. 
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India’s energy future carries implications for both global outcomes and national development 
objectives. From a global perspective, India’s current and expected future emissions are sufficiently 
large to affect global mitigation efforts. In 2014, India emitted 6.6% of global emissions. This share 
will invariably grow since India is starting at a low base of per capita emissions – 2.5 tons/capita, 
which is 37% of the global average (WRI 2014). This growth presents a challenge at a time when 
global emissions need to decline. From a national perspective, however, India’s development future 
cannot be assured without increasing levels of energy use for millions, which likely requires some 
increase in emissions. Clearly, these are inter-related challenges – India’s efforts to increase energy 
use are shaped by a climate mitigation context that is driving rapid changes in energy technology, 
which provides opportunities but also creates uncertainties.  
The resultant effect can be hard to interpret, with India variously tagged as a climate villain or hero. 
Some recent literature projects India on a rapid growth path fuelled by carbon-intensive coal, with 
alarming implications for climate change (van Breevoort et al 2015, IEA 2015, Shearer et al 2017, 
Steckel et al 2015). The counter narrative, on the other hand, hails India as the forerunner of a low-
carbon future based on its efforts to rapidly deploy renewable energy (Höhne et al 2017, Anand 
2017, Balaraman 2017). What accounts for these different perceptions, and how credibly are they 
rooted in facts and analysis? 
Despite the existence of several studies attempting to project India’s energy future, the scope for 
widely varying conclusions persist for two reasons. First, India is undergoing rapid economic and 
social transition, which amplifies the usual uncertainties that derive from technology and economic 
growth rates.  For example, India is going through simultaneous demographic and urbanisation 
transitions, and has to overcome the burden of low levels of access to reliable commercial energy. 
Thus, assumptions about whether India will follow a manufacturing or services led approach to 
providing jobs, whether its cities are compact or sprawling, and how it provides energy to its citizens 
will all affect projections about energy and emission futures. In brief, India’s uncertain development 
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choices condition its energy and emissions outcomes. Second, and related, in recent years the Indian 
policy environment around these issues has been shifting rapidly, further complicating the task of 
projection. As we show, individual studies often produce widely disparate results, in part because 
each study makes their own assumptions about uncertain development and policy futures. 
In this letter, we deploy a novel, interpretative approach to understanding and bounding 
uncertainties in India’s emission and energy projections. This approach is needed because existing 
studies are based upon separate, often implicit, assumptions about uncertain development and 
policy futures. While each is plausibly defensible, they collectively generate a wide range of results 
that require further interpretation in order to yield insights. Starting with fifteen scenarios drawn 
from seven studies, we show how an interpretive approach is a useful, perhaps even necessary, 
complement to model-based scenario analysis. 
We adopt a two-step approach. While we begin by quantitative comparison across the studies, our 
innovation lies in making explicit the implied development choices, technology futures, and policy 
assumptions made by these studies, which allows us to cluster results in a manner that enables 
interpretation.  In a second step, we examine trends in India’s current policy landscape, with a focus 
on electricity, and use this as a benchmark against which to judge the scenarios’ assumptions and 
projections. The application of careful interpretive techniques to model results and the reality-check 
against current policy trends, we suggest, represents an innovation in the literature on energy and 
emissions projections. This complementary step is particularly important in the context of rapidly 
changing emerging economies.  
The resulting analysis concludes that a doubling of India’s CO2 emissions from energy from 2012 
levels is a likely upper bound for India’s 2030 emissions, beyond which the models, collectively, do 
not enable comment. This trajectory through 2030 is consistent with meeting India’s Paris emissions 
intensity pledge.  Model scenarios that project the effect of additional policies suggest scope for 
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lower emissions growth for India through 2030, but this scope is more limited for development 
focused scenarios than pure decarbonisation scenarios.  
Approach and Methods 
The dominant approach to understanding energy and climate futures is the use of scenario-based 
modelling studies. We argue that when a range of studies with differing assumptions and results are 
available, interpretive approaches provide a necessary complement, particularly in rapidly changing 
developing country contexts. In particular, we shine the spotlight on the implications of 
development choices and policy baselines.   
Existing studies of India’s energy and environmental future fall into three categories. The first are 
global or regional-scale models, that allow isolation of India or South Asia-specific projections (den 
Elzen et al 2016, Jackson et al 2016, Robiou du Pont et al 2016, van Soest et al 2015, Tavoni et al 
2015, UNEP 2017, Wu et al 2015, Gambhir et al 2014). Because these studies necessarily cannot 
account for country-specific detail but are intended to capture progress toward a global goal, such as 
carbon mitigation, they do not lend useful insights for an India-specific analysis. A second, much 
smaller, set of studies seek to synthesize Indian results and compare them to China (Hof et al 2015, 
Johansson et al 2015, Mittal et al 2016). These studies also analyse India’s future trajectory in the 
context of global GHG reduction pathways rather than national development and technology 
choices, and are limited to the analysis of variation in standard model parameters such as 
population, economic growth and energy intensity. A third set focus explicitly on India and develop 
scenarios, often informed by sector-specific assumptions, to project energy and emissions futures. 
This category of studies provide the necessary granular level of detail on energy-development 
choices, and seven of the most recent such studies, summarized in Table 1, form the source material 
for this Letter. 
The first step in our approach compares and interprets scenario results. This comparative exercise is 
necessary because, given the large uncertainties in India’s future development outcomes, the result 
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of each study is strongly determined by individual assumptions about those outcomes and related 
policy choices. To undertake this, we examine outputs and assumptions of fifteen scenarios drawn 
from the seven studies, and group the studies into interpretive categories to extract conclusions on 
future emissions, energy demand and energy supply. In comparing emissions projections, we report 
only the component that is comparable -- CO2 emissions from energy, excluding CO2 emissions from 
industrial processes and land use changes. In 2012, this subset of CO2 emissions represented about 
68% of India’s total GHG emissions (WRI 2014). We report emissions projections for 2030, the target 
date for India’s ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. To more 
completely interpret emissions projections, we further examine and compare scenario projections 
on India’s energy needs for development. This is a critical additional step, since divergent 
assumptions about energy needs, often implicit, may help explain disparate emissions projections. 
The second step further analyses model results in light of recent Indian policy trends. In India’s fast-
moving policy environment, this is necessary to benchmark model assumptions against the direction 
of recent policy changes. This analysis provides information with which to comment on and confirm 
likely bounds on model projections. For this purpose, we focus on the fast-moving electricity sector, 
which accounts for about half of India’s greenhouse gas emissions.  
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Table 1: Model scenarios reviewed 
Study Name (Abbreviation) Institution/Project (Date) Study 
timeline 
Year of 
current 
policies 
List of scenarios (selected for analysis in bold) 
Expert Group on “Low Carbon 
Strategies for Inclusive Growth” 
(LCSIG)(Planning Commission 
2014)  
Planning Commission, 
Government of India 
(2014) 
2007-2030 2011 Baseline Inclusive Growth (R), Low Carbon 
Inclusive Growth (P) 
The Energy Report – India. 100% 
Renewable Energy by 2050 
(TERI-WWF)(WWF-India and TERI 
2013) 
The Energy and Resources 
Institute (2013) 
2001-2051 2012 Reference Energy Scenario (R), 100% Renewable 
Energy Scenario (P) 
Energy-Emissions Trends and 
Policy Landscape for India 
(Shukla) (Shukla et al 2015b) 
Indian Institute of Management 
– Ahmedabad (2015) 
2005-2050 2014 Business As Usual, Scenarios 1 (R), 2,3,4 (P), 5* 
Quality of Life for All: A 
Sustainable Development 
Framework for India’s Climate 
Policy (CSTEP – QoL) (CSTEP 
2015) 
Centre for Science, Technology 
and Environment Policy (2015) 
2012-2030 2015 Business As Usual (R), Sustainable scenario (P) 
India Energy Security Scenarios 
2047 Version 2.0 (IESSv2) (NITI 
Aayog 2015) 
Energy Division, NITI Aayog, 
Government of India (2015) 
2012-2047 2015 Least Effort, Heroic Effort, Aggressive Effort, 
Determined Effort (DS) (R), Maximum Energy 
Security(MES)(P-1), Possible Energy Efficiency 
and Energy Mix, Maximum Clean and Renewable 
Energy Pathway (MCRE) (P-2), (across 3 growth 
scenarios: A, B, C)** 
India Energy Outlook (IEA) (IEA 
2015) 
International Energy Agency 
(2015) 
2013-2040 2015 New Policies Scenario (NPS) (R-1), India Vision 
Case (IVC) (R-2)*** 
Pathways to deep 
decarbonization in India (DDPP) 
(Shukla et al 2015a) 
Deep decarbonisation pathways 
project (2015) 
2010-2050 2015 Conventional deep decarbonization (CDD) (P-1), 
Sustainable deep decarbonization (SDD) (P-
2)**** 
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*Shukla: Scenario 1, which models partial implementation of current policies is chosen as the reference scenario because it is most comparable to reference scenarios in 
other studies. Scenario 4 is chosen as the policy scenario as it is the mid-level policy scenario, and it is categorized as ‘policy-hybrid’ because it combines national and 
international policy targets. 
** IESSv2: The “Determined Effort” scenario was chosen as the reference case as this is the closest to a current policy option in the study. Two policy scenarios were 
chosen -- “Maximum Energy Security” and “Maximum Clean and Renewable Energy” because they provide distinct and complementary insight on future energy policy. The 
mid-level growth scenario (B) was chosen for all three scenarios. 
*** IEA: Both IEA scenarios are designated reference scenarios, since neither seeks to represent an energy transition explicitly but rather represents alternative 
development scenarios. The New Policies Scenario represents partial implementation of current policies, and the India Vision scenario represents the full pursuit of current 
high-priority policy objectives, notably enhanced domestic manufacturing and electricity access.  
****DDPP: Both the DDPP scenarios model a combination of domestic objectives and a low carbon reorientation of India’s energy system through additional policies and 
are therefore considered policy scenarios. 
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India’s CO2 Emissions Projections in 2030 
The India modelling studies project a wide range of 2030 projections for CO2, the lowest projecting a 
9% increase from 2012 levels, and the highest a 169% increase. Figure 1 plots these outcomes 
against the range of average annual GDP growth rate projections used by the studies, ranging from 
6.5% to 8.0%. Indeed, the range of projected 2030 emissions is so large as to be of the same order of 
magnitude as India’s current emissions.  
To interpret this range, we cluster the results in four categories. We first draw a distinction between 
‘reference’ scenarios that estimates of India’s energy future based on the current policy 
environment, and ‘policy’ scenarios that model aspirational policies. We further sub-categorize 
reference scenarios into ‘reference 2015’ and ‘reference pre-2015’ to indicate the base year of 
current policies and capture the rapid changes in policy. We also sub-categorize policy scenarios into 
‘policy-national’ for policies shaped primarily by national development objectives, and ‘policy-hybrid’ 
to represent scenarios that include national development and global climate objectives. Where a 
study includes multiple reference or policy scenarios, we choose those that best represent the 
categories described above, explained further in Table 1. 
A closer examination of reference scenarios shows that recently introduced policies (2015 and 
beyond), summarized in Table 2, are projected to have a material impact on reducing India’s future 
emissions, and would bring them in line with its NDC pledge. This result is reflected in a comparison 
of reference scenarios based on pre-2015 policies with those that include policies introduced in 2015 
and later. Thus, under the reference 2015 scenarios, Indian emissions are projected to rise to 3.8-
4.9Gt, or 91-151% above 2012 levels. However, the upper-limit is driven by an outlier scenario (#4), 
which unlike its category counterparts, includes an assumption of full implementation of India’s 
target to increase domestic coal production. This assumption which, as we discuss later, is 
questionable, drives its significantly larger emission and coal generation projections, leading us to 
exclude this study from the reference 2015 cluster in Figure 1. Without the outlier scenario (#4), the 
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reference 2015 scenarios form a tighter pattern, projecting India’s emissions to rise 3.8-3.9 Gt, or 91-
98% above 2012 levels, which is a level consistent with its NDC pledge of 33-35% reduction in 
emissions intensity from 2005 levels by 2030 (Government of India 2015).  By contrast, reference 
pre-2015 scenarios, which have been rendered less relevant by recent policy developments, are 
projected to lead to a significantly higher rise of 4.5-5.3Gt or 129-169% above 2012 levels.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 | 2030 annual carbon dioxide emission from energy projections for India. The figure plots 2030 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy against average annual GDP growth rates used by each scenario. The 
secondary y-axis indicates the percent change of CO2 emissions from India’s 2012 level. Scenarios are 
categorized into reference (R) and policy (P) scenarios. Reference scenarios are further subdivided into 
Reference-pre-2015 and Reference-2015, referring to the base year of “current policies” assumed by the 
different studies. Policy scenarios (“P”) are subdivided into Policy-national and Policy-hybrid, to identify policy 
scenarios aimed at national objectives, and those with a hybrid of national development and global 
decarbonization aims. When more than one scenario is included from the same study, we annotate the 
scenario acronym with a number e.g. (R-1), (R-2), (P-1), (P-2).  
Page 10 of 28AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-105150.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
ted
 M
an
us
cri
pt
11 
  
The red dotted lines represent the CO2 emissions from energy in 2030 at different average annual GDP growth 
rates from 2005, corresponding to India’s INDC target of a 33-35% reduction from the GHG intensity level in 
2005. In constructing these lines, we make the simplifying assumption that the share of emissions from energy 
(our scope here) remains the same in 2030 as in 2012.   
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Table 2: India’s existing policies relevant to mitigation and energy 
Year Policy area Description 
ENERGY SUPPLY 
2015 Renewables  
175 GW target of renewable energy capacity by 
2022* 
2015 
Domestic coal 
production 
Increasing domestic coal production to 1 BT from 
government and 0.5 BT from private firms by 2020 
2010 Coal cess 
A coal cess to finance clean technology. Set in 2013 
at INR 50/t, it doubled annually to INR 400/t until 
2016.* 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY & CLEAN TECHNOLOGY 
2012 
Industrial energy 
efficiency 
A “Perform, Achieve and Trade” domestic energy 
efficiency credit trading scheme for industries* 
2014, updated 
in 2015 
Subsidized LED bulbs 
Aims at replacing 770 million inefficient bulbs by 
2019.* 
2013, updated 
in 2015 
LPG access 
Targeted subsidies for LPG cylinders and gas 
connections to women from families “Below 
Poverty Line”* 
2015 
Light vehicles fuel 
standards 
Leapfrogging from Euro IV to Euro VI standards by 
2020.* 
2013, updated 
in 2017 
Electric mobility 
Aims at penetration of hybrid and electric vehicles, 
targeting no new fossil fuel powered vehicles by 
2030* 
INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSITIONS 
2006 
Dedicated freight 
corridors 
Enhancing rail freight infrastructure between major 
metros* 
2014, updated 
in 2017 
Electricity for All Aims at 24/7 supply to all households by 2019* 
2015 “Make in India” Encouraging manufacturing in India* 
2015 Urban infrastructure 
Smart Cities Mission*, basic services* and Housing 
for All by 2020 
2007, updated 
in 2017 
Commercial building 
energy standards 
A voluntary Energy Conservation Building Code. 
Sources: Authors’ own assessment from websites of Government of India Ministries 
*Mentioned in India’s INDC 
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Additional policies beyond those in place in 2015 (see policy scenarios in Table 1) could feasibly 
lower 2030 emissions considerably: emissions from these policy scenarios are 32-45% lower than 
their respective reference cases.  However, policy scenarios fall into two types. Policy-national 
scenarios driven primarily by national interests – such as clean energy, energy security, job creation 
or their mix – result in a modest over-compliance with the NDC pledge, at about 53-96% above 2012 
levels. A second category of policy-hybrid scenarios, which explicitly also include a global carbon 
objective, result in substantially lower 2030 emissions, the low end of which is only 9% above 2012 
emissions, which would be a substantial over-compliance with the NDC pledge. 
Significantly, despite a considerable increase in absolute emissions under most scenarios, India’s per 
capita emissions under all scenarios remain modest -- 2.5-3.6 t/cap under all reference scenarios, 
and 2.0-2.6t/cap under all policy scenarios. These results would place India’s 2030 per capita CO2 
emissions, even after two decades of steep rise in absolute emissions, well below the 2014 global 
average of 4.7 t/cap (Boden et al 2017). 
Of these scenario clusters, we suggest that the reference-2015 cluster, corresponding to a doubling 
of emissions by 2030 from a 2012 base, represents a likely upper bound for India’s 2030 emissions 
for three reasons. First, reference-2015 scenarios best capture the current policy environment. 
Second, as the studies factor in political realism by assuming only partial rather than full 
implementation of recent policies in Table 2, full implementation of low-carbon policies would result 
in even lower emissions. Third, the reference-2015 studies assume average annual GDP growth rates 
between 7.0-7.5% over until 2030, which are higher than historical average annual growth rates of 
6.1% for the 1990s and 7.1% for the 2000s (The World Bank 2017). While a higher growth rate is 
feasible, it is unlikely to be sustained over fifteen years; a likely lower average growth rate would 
result in lower emissions.  
Notably, China’s 2015 emissions from energy of 9085 Mt CO2 is more than double  India’s projected 
2030 emissions from energy that we consider an upper bound (IEA 2017a, p 96). Thus, over the next 
Page 13 of 28 AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-105150.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
pt
d M
a
u
cri
pt
14 
  
decade or so, India’s emissions growth, while significant, is at a lower scale and pace than China’s in 
the preceding two decades. Equally, however, as discussed below, India’s energy needs for 
development suggest that some increases in energy use and emissions are near unavoidable if India 
is to fully realise development opportunities.  
India’s Energy Needs for Development 
Underlying the substantial range of emissions projections – from a low of 12% above 2012 levels in 
2030 to a high of 169% -- are diverse assumptions about India’s energy future. The scope for 
variation in these assumptions is large because India has not, as yet, locked into infrastructure, 
socio-economic patterns and technology choices around energy use (Seto et al 2016).  For example, 
in the coming decades India will have to undergo three major transitions: provide commercial 
cooking energy to 800 million people and electricity to 300 million (Jain et al 2015, IEA 2015); 
manage a shift from 30% to 50% urbanization (MoHUPA, Government of India 2016); and provide 
jobs for an estimated 10 million new job seekers a year (FICCI - Ernst & Young 2015). The choice of 
energy futures will be shaped, in part, by the pathways chosen for these development transitions. 
Models face the challenging task of simulating these choices and their effects.  
To do so, many of the India studies are framed around development futures from which energy 
implications are indirectly derived. For example, the Government of India’s low carbon study (LCSIG) 
interprets inclusive growth in terms of direct provision of services to the poor – housing, clean 
cooking fuel and electricity, health and education services (Planning Commission 2014). The 
International Energy Agency’s India Vision case (IEA IVC) highlights two high-profile government 
objectives: generating jobs through manufacturing; and providing full energy access (IEA 2015). 
CSTEP highlights sustainable development (CSTEP 2015). Other studies focus more narrowly on 
energy and carbon related outcomes such as decarbonisation (DDPP) (Shukla et al 2015a), low 
carbon policies (Shukla) (Shukla et al 2015b), energy security and clean energy (IESS) (NITI Aayog 
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2015), and accelerated renewable energy adoption (TERI-WWF) (WWF-India and TERI 2013). The 
spread in emission outcomes derives, at least in part, from a spread in the framing of the studies. 
These varied foci for development and energy futures complicate demand-side projections since 
they lead to different choices about the large-scale transitions upon which India is embarked.  
Despite this diversity, three demand-side commonalities emerge from the studies, which help 
explain the emission trajectories discussed above. First, energy demand will invariably increase 
through 2030 as India transitions; India has to find ways of meeting this additional demand (Figure 
2). Second, recent policy actions are projected to reduce future demand; comparison of pre-2015 to 
2015 reference cases indicate that recent demand-reducing policies (see Table 2) considerably 
lowers demand projection, from 223% for reference-pre 2015 to 90-140% for reference-2015. Third, 
additional policies can reduce demand still more; comparing reference to policy scenarios within 
individual studies shows a consistent demand reduction. So while India’s energy demand will 
invariably grow, the magnitude of growth is indeed amenable to policy intervention, and recent 
policies have begun to curtail India’s future demand. 
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Figure 2 | 2030 final energy demand projections for India. The bar in grey indicates India’s final energy 
demand in 2012. Colors designate the scenario sub-categories, while shapes are unique to each scenario. Each 
point represents a model projection for final energy demand in 2030, on the same scale. Reference cases are 
plotted in the left, while policy cases are plotted on the right. A dotted, grey line connects reference and policy 
scenarios from the same study. The secondary axis indicates percentage change of values from 2012.  
 
On the supply side, meeting India’s far greater 2030 energy demand rests on untangling the complex 
inter-connected projections of coal use and renewable energy growth.  First, through 2030, the 
extent of coal growth will likely remain the dominant determinant of India’s energy future (Figure 3). 
While oil and gas use are both projected to rise, the magnitude of change is swamped by projected 
coal increases. This ranges from a doubling or more in reference scenarios to a more modest, but 
still substantial, 54% to 118% increase in policy-national scenarios.  Two of the three policy-hybrid 
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scenarios project smaller increases, or even a decrease, in coal use. This result turns on a shift to gas 
and extremely high rates of renewable energy uptake in electricity which, in 2012, accounted for 
49.6% of the emissions covered by the studies (NITI Aayog 2015). Displacement of fossil fuels is likely 
to turn on the speed of decarbonisation in the electricity sector. 
Second, as Figure 4 shows that the studies uniformly project high rates of non-fossil fuel electricity 
growth, primarily from modern renewables. Indeed, even in reference cases, India is projected to 
generate as much non-fossil fuel electricity by 2030 as it generated from all sources in 2012, with 
even steeper increases under policy scenarios suggesting lower fossil fuel use. Despite these gains, 
further decarbonisation may be limited because total electricity demand will rise even faster than 
renewables, necessitating an overall growth in fossil fuel use. However, as we will explore in the next 
section, these results need to be interpreted in the light of falling renewable energy prices globally, 
increasing stranded coal assets and decreased estimates of coal requirements in India and increasing 
consideration of environmental co-benefits such as air quality which collectively point to a lower 
carbon future than currently projected. 
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Figure 3 | 2030 primary fossil fuel supply projections for India. Follows the format of Figure 2, but represents 
primary fossil fuel supply projections for 2030. 
Page 18 of 28AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-105150.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
19 
  
 
Figure 4 | 2030 electricity generation projections for India. Follows the format of Figure 2, but represents 
electricity generation projections for 2030. 
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Recent Electricity Policy Trends and Implications for Model Results 
India’s energy policy landscape is evolving rapidly. The country makes frequent policy 
announcements that carry implications for efforts to project future energy and emission patterns. 
Consequently, as a second step of the analysis, we revisit the model results presented above in light 
of emergent policy or price trends. In addition, this analysis allows us to identify key contingent 
factors that could drive future trends. In this section, we focus only on the electricity sector, where 
policy has been particularly fast moving, and which is an important component of India’s emissions. 
First, there are systematic indications from recent policy that growth in electricity demand, and 
therefore generation, is likely to be lower than previously expected. The Government of India’s 
“Electric Power Survey”, an official document used by Indian State governments to plan electricity 
investments based on the self-assessment of demand by utilities, lowered its projection of electricity 
generation needs in 2026/27 by 24.4%, from 2710 TWh in its 2012 edition to 2047 TWh in the most 
recent 2017 edition (CEA 2017b, p 9). This reduced growth in generation is due both to lower actual 
generation realized by utilities between 2012 and 2016 than that projected in 2012, and lower 
projections for the future, through 2026/27. The resultant projections are broadly in line with the 
reference 2015 estimates of the modelling studies. 
However, future electricity generation is likely to be contingent on several factors, which muddy the 
waters. The pace and extent of adoption of energy efficiency, loss reducing measures and off-grid 
electricity such as rooftop solar will be key factors, as also highlighted by the Electric Power Survey 
(CEA 2017b, p 81). India has had a particularly strong track record in the area of energy efficiency, 
with high-profile LED lighting and appliance efficiency programs, with plans for expansion (Chunekar 
et al 2017). Recent policy announcements signalling Indian intent to accelerate transition to electric 
vehicle sales by 2030 (Ministry of Power 2018, IEA 2017b), if realised, would exercise considerable 
upward pressure on electricity generation needs, although these would be compensated in emission 
terms by decreased need for transportation fossil fuels. Another significant contingent factor is the 
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future state of India’s problematic electricity distribution system. Since 2016-17 India has witnessed 
the curious phenomenon of surplus electricity capacity coexisting with millions unserved (CEA 
2016b, p i), because providing power to the unserved would further worsen distribution company 
finances (Josey et al 2017). If this situation is reversed and latent demand is unleashed, electricity 
demand could rise; if this situation persists, electricity demand could remain even below that 
officially projected.  
Second, there has been a steep decline in prices of renewable energy in India, as globally, suggesting 
the potential for a faster ramp-up in renewable electricity adoption than assumed in previous 
studies. The cost of solar electricity has plummeted from 0.356 USD/kWh (17.91 INR/kWh) in 2010 
(CERC 2010) to 0.038 USD/kWh (2.44 INR/kWh) by 2017(MNRE 2017), all in 2017 prices, driven both 
by falling hardware costs but also by well-structured policy based on a reverse auction mechanism 
(Chawla and Aggarwal 2016). Wind energy prices have also fallen steeply to 0.053 USD/kWh (3.46 
INR/kWh)(CERC 2017). While some have raised questions about the sustainability of these low 
prices, and whether they reflect over-aggressive bids (Bridge to India 2017, Kamili 2017) there is 
little doubt that, at minimum, the price trend is firmly in the direction of cost competitiveness with 
coal-based electricity.  
Third, despite mixed policy signals, evidence is gradually mounting that interest in coal production 
and coal-based electricity generation is diminishing based both on policy statements and private 
sector reactions. In 2015, the Government pronounced the need for substantial increases in coal 
production – up to 1.5 BT from government and private sources, representing a 120% increase over 
2016 levels by 2019-20 (Ministry of Coal 2017, 2015, PWC & ICC 2016).  A range of evidence, 
however, suggests that at least based on electricity needs, which in 2015-16 accounted for about 
84% of coal use (Ministry of Coal 2017, p 4.30), this expansion in coal production is unjustified.  
While a recent estimate suggests 243GW of new coal-fired capacity is in planning or construction 
(Shearer et al 2017) – a substantial 120% of 2017 capacity (CEA 2017a, p 1), estimates of required 
Page 21 of 28 AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-105150.R1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
pt
 M
an
us
cri
pt
22 
  
plants are far lower. Thus, an independent bottom-up analysis suggests only an additional 81-110 
GW is needed between 2015 and 2020, which would require less coal than mooted in the 
government target (Sehgal and Tongia 2016, p 31). An even lower estimate of 44GW of additional 
coal-fired capacity required to meet the country’s needs through 2026-27 is projected by the 
Government’s own draft National Electricity Plan, which draws on the Government’s authoritative 
Electric Power Survey (discussed above) (CEA 2016a, p xxv). Since 50GW is already under 
construction, the Plan states no further investment in coal fired power is required. There are other, 
contradictory government statements, notably a draft National Energy Policy produced by a 
different government agency that projects growth of coal capacity by 330-441GW by 2040 (NITI 
Aayog 2017, p 34), counter-intuitively implying rapid coal-fired expansion after 2026-27, when 
renewable energy is likely to be even cheaper. Moreover, this is a projection, while the National 
Electricity Plan is an operational document, which provides the basis, for example, of a tender for 
preparation of a ‘Coal Vision 2030’ document (Coal India Limited 2017, p 36).  
There remain vested interests in coal usage and investment which can generate opposition to the 
uptake of renewables (Edenhofer et al 2018). However, analysis aimed at private investors notes 
declining attractiveness and increasing risk of coal-based power investments (Shearer et al 2017, 
Sharda and Buckley 2016), based on a track record of cancellation of plants because of surplus 
requirements, a steep increase in a coal tax, low coal plant load factors, and falling renewable 
energy costs. Finally, additional downward pressure on coal comes from likely environmental 
constraints around air pollution (The Lancet 2016) and water (Srinivasan et al 2017, Dharmadhikary 
and Dixit 2011).  
In brief, Indian policy discussions since 2015 in the electricity sector suggests a lowering of demand 
growth expectations, increasingly favourable conditions for renewable electricity development and 
lower, if inconsistent, projections for coal use and growing pessimism about its future. However, 
there are also several contingent factors on which these conclusions depend, particularly with 
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regard to the pace of demand growth. Taken collectively, a reading of recent policy and investor 
signals suggest that in the electricity sector, while energy needs will certainly grow, the trends 
reinforce a perception that this increase will continue at a decreasing rather than increasing rate 
relative to past expectations. Consequently, modelling results for 2030 based on 2015 policy trends 
can reasonably be interpreted as an upper bound on future emissions.  
Conclusion 
This interpretive analysis of Indian energy models’ results, combined with insights from recent Indian 
policy trends suggests two conclusions on India’s energy and emissions future. First, a doubling of 
India’s energy-based CO2 emissions from 2012 levels, based on projections of 2015 policies, can 
reasonably be considered an upper bound for 2030 emissions, although the studies do not enable a 
projection beyond 2030. This trajectory through 2030 is consistent with India’s Paris NDC pledge. 
That this is an upper bound is reinforced by recent trends toward lower than expected electricity 
demand, although there remain significant uncertainties on this point, and a faster than expected 
transition from coal to renewable energy. Also, despite a doubling of absolute emissions, India’s per 
capita emissions in 2030 will remain well below today’s global average. Notably, even after a 
doubling by 2030, Indian emissions will be considerably below that of China’s current emissions, 
suggesting that within the next decade, India is unlikely to play as dominant a role in shaping global 
emissions futures as China has played in the past decade. 
Second, given development needs, India’s emissions will almost certainly grow. However, policy 
scenarios suggest there is scope for reduction in the rate of that growth. Among scenarios, those 
based on policies determined by national development objectives, consistent with the NDC 
approach, project more moderate reduction in the rate of growth than scenarios that lay significant 
emphasis on decarbonisation. There is insufficient evidence to indicate whether deep 
decarbonisation scenarios are consistent with attainment of India’s development aspirations; the 
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national development focused scenarios offer a more likely basis for discussion given India’s 
considerable future energy needs.  
Finally, this analysis for India suggests a broader methodological point: particularly in rapidly 
changing developing economies, interpretive approaches provide a useful, and even necessary, 
complement to quantitative scenario analysis. It also reinforces the importance of greater 
transparency in model assumptions. Because countries such as India are facing large scale socio-
economic and demographic changes, and starting from a low base of energy use, modelling studies 
have to take into account not just energy futures, but alternative national development pathways 
which are often reflected in rapidly changing policy directives (Winkler 2014, 2009, Raubenheimer 
2011). Despite the greater analytical challenge of such a broad framing, future modelling studies on 
energy and environment will be more useful if they explicitly engage with the implications of 
alternative ways of addressing nationally determined development choices. 
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